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It is a truth universally acknowledged that a zombie in possession of 
brains must be in want of more brains. 
Seth Grahame-Smith 
1. Introduction 
The desire to exercise control beyond the grave is deeply rooted in the human psyche. 
Before we die, we try to create cues that preserve our identity in the minds of the 
survivors.1 The survivor is left with images, materials, and wishes of the deceased that 
allow, or force, them to act on upon information and behaviours that were part of the 
deceased when he or she was alive.2 This is nowhere more obvious than in the law 
governing wills and testaments. Even if (most of us) realise that we cannot take our 
wealth with us, many of us hope nevertheless to control at least in part how our 
financial assets are used when we are not around any longer.3 This too is in part an 
identity preservation strategy, as for exercising control beyond the grave there must 
be a something as substratum of this control. Once a prerogative for the powerful and 
wealthy whose testaments, famously like Caesar’s, could shape the fate of entire 
nations, the testament’s historical roots in the west can be traced back to the law 
reforms of Solon. It then became a mainstream tool for the disposal of assets in 
Roman law. Roman law also gave us the blueprint for the trust in the legates and 
fideicommissa and with that the instrument, not just for controlling who should 
inherit, but also an enforceable means for controlling how assets were to be used. 
“Communication technologies” played for obvious reasons an important part for wills 
and testaments from the beginning. Since the testator is not around by definition and 
cannot be asked for his or her opinion, he or she needs to find ways to reliably 
communicate his or her intentions to the executors in a will. The advent of writing and 
improvements of writing and document storage facilities in archives were from the 
beginning a driving force in the development of wills and testaments as tools to 
engineer and control ones future. More recently, use of video recordings added a new 
dimension of “immediacy” to the way in which a testator can communicate with the 
executor and the heirs. In a variation of this theme, US soldiers often make video 
recordings for their children prior to deployment into a battle zone, with the idea that 
if they do not return, the children will get parental advice at predetermined points in 
time.  
This paper will explore if the “artificial brains” software developed in AI research 
could become the next generation of tools to exercise control “beyond the grave” and 
create identify maintaining cues in the way Unruh described which is similar to the 
“personal backup” popularised in the novels of the Scottish writer Iain Banks. It will 
argue that such an approach could revitalise previously abandoned themes in legal AI 
research. In the first part, we develop an analysis of the methodological challenges 
encountered by legal AI research in developing systems that can autonomously 
interpret legal norms. In the second part we describe a new application, the use of 
expert systems in inheritance law, which can use the positive insights that were gained 
                                                 
1
 R Butler, “Looking Forward to What? The Life Review, Legacy and Excessive Identity versus 
Change” (1970) 14 American Behavioural Scientist 121-128. 
2
 DR Unruh, “Death and Personal History: Strategies of Identity Preservation” (1983) 30 Social 
Problems 340-351. 
3
 See e.g. J Rosenfeld, “Old Age, New Beneficiaries: Kinship, Friendship and (Dis)inheritance” (1980) 
64 Sociology and Social Research 86-95. 
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in the early days of research into legal AI, while avoiding the systemic 
methodological problems earlier, more ambitious projects had encountered.  
2. Back to the Future 
In the early days of legal AI and legal expert system research, the image of the 
computer judge provided a powerful metaphor that brought the hopes and aspirations 
of the research community to the point. The image did not just influence research in 
legal AI, but also jurisprudence4 and popular literature.5 But despite several promising 
results, the ultimate goal of fully automated judicial decision making remained 
elusive. The early enthusiasm was followed by a period of introspection in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which led to an increasingly critical reassessment of the computerised 
decision maker in law, and a “new modesty” in legal AI research. As a result of this 
phase of introspection, systemic problems in the project of developing computer 
judges were identified that seem to make any attempt to revive the notion in 2010 
unfeasible on conceptual, philosophical, methodological and ethical grounds. The idea 
of a fully automated reasoner that interprets legal rules and suggests solutions in 
specific cases seems today distinctly like an anachronistic return to the 1980s. The 
idea is dead and we should let it rest – or so it seems but, as one would expect in a 
special section on zombies, the dead do not always stay in their graves. This article 
will then try to revive the idea and to come up with a new “business model” for 
computer assisted norm interpretation that is fully informed by methodological 
debates within the AI and law community. 
3. From Automated Legal Interpretation to Decision Support System 
To achieve its aims, a computer judge should have been capable of applying general, 
abstract norms correctly to the facts of a specific case. But attempts to formalise this 
process of subsuming specific cases under general norms soon ran into apparently 
insurmountable difficulties: 
 
1. The inherent vagueness of legal texts. To be sufficiently flexible and 
capable of regulating situations unforeseen by the legislator at the point of 
law making, legal language is necessarily vague to a certain degree. This 
results in a need for interpretation and with that the capture of the meta-
level rules that guide the interpretative process.  
2. The value-ladenness of law and legal language. To be able to give an 
adequate interpretation, judges need to refer to values implicit in the legal 
system. Their own moral, political and philosophical commitments play a 
necessary, albeit problematic, part in this process.  
3. The symbiotic relationship between facts and norms. How the facts of a 
case are described and the factual proofs that were taken regularly preempt 
the legal interpretation. 
4. The contested nature of law. In particular in appeal cases, both sides will 
have good arguments on their sides. The “one right answer” which is part 
                                                 
4
 R Susskind, “Detmold’s Computer Judge Revisited” (1986) 49 Modern Law Review 683-684.  
5
 See http://theinfosphere.org/Computer_Judge (accessed 2 Jul 2010). 
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and parcel of discourses in the natural sciences hardly more than a 
jurisprudential abstraction in law. In particular, in cases where the court 
itself is divided and a decision is reached by simple majority voting, it is 
obvious that the opposite solution would also have been a possible that is a 
consistent, solution. For legal informatics, this opens up two follow-on 
questions:  
a. If it is possible that even the top experts rationally hold mutually 
contradictory opinions, what exactly is the “knowledge” that the 
computer models, and on what basis is the decision what to 
include, or which one to chose, taken?  
b. What does it mean for the evaluation of the computer judge? Under 
which conditions are we entitled to say that the programme is 
working correctly and that the “right” decisions are reached? 
The wider AI community developed tentative answers for some of these questions, 
which were also received in research into legal AI. Layman Allen in particular 
developed formal approaches to model the interpretation of legal norms that drew 
extensively from ideas from generic natural language processing research in the 
1980s.6 However, it became apparent that the specific methodological particularities 
of the legal domain impeded a wholesale adoption of approaches from general AI for 
the development of commercial-strength expert systems.  
Modern AI research, for instance, makes extensive use of neural network and 
automated learning approaches, which allow computers to acquire knowledge on how 
to disambiguate vague terms in a given context.7 In legal AI, this approach has also 
been used with some success in systems such as Split-Up und and related systems.8 
The comparative success of Split-Up is however based on the advantageous properties 
of the specific domain that it models, divorce law, and hence can only within strict 
confines be extended to other applications. It does not attempt to model reasoning by 
appeal courts on the meaning of legal terms, but takes decisions of first instance 
courts as input that deal primarily with “unproblematic” subsumption of fact-rich 
situations under legal provisions. The main difficulty a lawyer faces in these cases is 
the number of parameters that are relevant for the decision (such as the contributions 
of both parties to the acquisition of major items such as the family home during their 
marriage). Computers are good at keeping track of these large numbers of items under 
consideration and thus add real value to the practicalities of decision making. This 
focus on first instance decisions also guarantees a large number of training examples 
that are a prerequisite of automated learning based approaches. The legal rules in 
question often explicitly refer to mathematical operations to divide the assets between 
the parties, and in that sense display their formal structure so to speak on the surface. 
Furthermore, decisions are typically not simple yes-no answers, but permit the judge 
to divide the communal assets in a multitude of graded ways. It makes sense therefore 
                                                 
6
 LE Allen and CS Saxon “Multiple Interpretations of the Logical Structure of Legal Rules: 
Impediment or Boon to Legal Expert Systems?” in RA Kowalski and KA Bowen (eds), Logic 
Programming: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference and Symposium, Seattle, 
Washington, August 15-18, 1988 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) 1609-1623. 
7
 S Lawren and S Fong, “Natural Language Grammatical Inference: A Comparison of Recurrent Neural 
Networks and Machine Learning Methods” (2006) 1040 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 33-47.  
8
 J Zeleznikow, “Building Judicial Decision Support Systems in Discretionary Legal Domains” (2000) 
14 International Review of Computers, Law and Information Technology 341-356. 
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to ask for the “average” decision – what percentage of the property can a party “on 
average” expect, if the litigant was given custody of the children after six years of 
marriage? This is also one of the reasons why Split-Up, despite its success, is 
marketed as a decision support tool only, not as a full fledged computer judge. It is 
helpful for a party to know in advance what amount of money it can broadly expect, 
for instance to take a rational cost-benefit analysis. But this means of course that the 
decision in the individual case can still differ to a considerable extent, simply because 
it is reached at by a specific, not an “average” judge, and on a specific, not a “normal” 
set of circumstances. Taken together, recognition of the presuppositions that enabled 
the success of Split-Up allows us to identify some further methodological issues: 
c. The majority of court decisions are not published and hence are not 
available to train an expert system.  
d. Only a selection of cases is accepted by the appeal courts for 
decision, and hence there are even fewer authoritative training 
examples where word meaning is disambiguated.  
e. Even in these decided cases, the reasoning that informs the 
decision is not always sufficiently clear to make straightforward 
training examples, they often create ambiguities of their own, and 
asking the decision maker is not normally possible.  
We can now reformulate the problem of computerised legal decision making. Legal 
language is ambiguous so that it can adjust to changing circumstances and unforeseen 
conditions. Therefore, a good test for a computer judge is the ability to predict 
decisions by real judges accurately. But since the number of relevant training 
examples and with that the empirical input is low, the number of variables and 
unknowns high – amongst them the moral, political and philosophical convictions of 
as yet unknown future judges – developing robust computerised decision makers is 
problematic. Robustness in expert system design is understood as the ability to deal 
with new and unforeseen circumstances correctly. But as we have seen, evaluating the 
“correctness” of the answers is in itself problematic. What counts as a “correct” 
decision is often contested within the relevant legal community. That is a problem in 
particular when the result must be a binary decision and the average outcomes are 
unhelpful.  
We said above that the lessons that the AI and law community learned from these 
methodological reflections could be described as “new modesty”. Rather than aiming 
at computers that can interpret legal norms autonomously and reach a decision, 
computers are now mainly described as decision or argumentation support tools. Most 
of the actual interpretations of legal norms – the core skill of the legal profession – are 
done by the user, often in an ex-post-facto analysis. In this way, a user trained in law 
will be able to check if his or her proposed argument meets some formal minimum 
requirements of consistency and completeness, e.g. checking if all pertinent questions 
are answered, and no circular use of premises occurs.9 
                                                 
9
 See also TF Gordon “Juristische Argumentation als Modellierungsprozess” in R Traunmüller and M 
Wimmer (eds), Informatik in Recht und Verwaltung: Gestern - Heute – Morgen (Bonn: Gesellschaft für 
Informatik, 2009) 104–112; FJ Bex et al “Sense-Making Software for Crime Investigation: How to 
Combine Stories and Arguments?” (2007) 6 Law, Probability & Risk 145-168. 
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This reorientation, however, also meant that many of the older ideas and approaches 
in legal AI, despite their theoretical validity, became irrelevant. We argue that this 
might have been premature. As the success of Split-Up shows, it is often the choice of 
the right domain that decides about the validity and success of a legal AI system. Can 
we find applications of legal reasoning that minimise the methodological problems 
identified above and nevertheless preserve the focus on the interpretation of legal 
norms and the disambiguation of terms? This could result in a revival of some of the 
older approaches, and a theoretically more ambitious and rewarding field of study.  
4. Know Thyself – The User as Norm Giver and Norm Interpreter 
Hauser: Howdy, stranger! I’m Hauser. If things haven’t gone wrong, I’m talking 
to myself and you don’t have a wet towel around your head. Now, whatever your 
name is, get ready for the big surprise. You are not you, you’re me. 
Douglas Quaid: [to himself] No shit. 
   Total Recall (1990) 
 
As we have seen, early approaches to legal expert system design tried to find 
solutions for decision making situations that are governed by a large number of 
imponderables and unknowns. The legislator necessarily communicates with citizens 
and the judiciary using vague terms that need interpretation. How exactly parliament 
would have wanted its own laws to be understood under new and unpredicted 
circumstances can however only be determined through an indirect, complex and 
ultimately contestable process of interpretation. This becomes even more complicated 
if we try to determine not just abstractly how parliament, were it asked, would want a 
term to be interpreted, but also when we try to anticipate the values, convictions and 
methodological preferences of future judges as decision makers. To reduce this 
complexity, we would ideally want a situation where we have to deal only with a 
single norm-giver, and a single, already known “judge” or norm-interpreter. This 
person could then be systematically interrogated to establish how she or he would 
interpret the terms of her or his own norms under a variety of hypothetical conditions, 
giving us a potentially unlimited number of training examples. Once the system has 
been trained sufficiently, we could then rely on this person as an objective benchmark 
for the evaluation of our system: it is correct of it predicts how the judge would have 
interpreted the norm in question correctly.  
The above quote from Total Recall is a fictitious example that comes close to the 
application suggested here. Hauser is about to get his memory wiped out to be 
transformed into the infiltrator Quaid. He needs to find a way to communicate to his 
own future self, which will have preferences and values intentionally designed to be 
very different from his present set of convictions about how to act. Technology gives 
him the means to do so in a recorded video clip where he explains to his own future 
self the background for his assignment and how he is now to understand the orders 
given to him. In this case, norm giver and norm interpreter are the same person (for a 
given value of “same person”)  and technology acts as a mediator to ensure that the 
present incarnation, Quaid, interprets the norms (“infiltrate the rebellion”) in a way 
that the earlier persona, Hauser, would have approved of.  
At this point, an analogy from another field of computer science research might be 
helpful. Research in computer assisted speech recognition distinguishes between 
(2010) 7:2 SCRIPTed 
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speaker dependent and speaker independent approaches.10 In speaker independent 
applications, the aim is to develop software for arbitrary, unknown users who can use 
the system immediately without needing training. This type of system tries for 
instance to handle calls to call centres. You can assume in advance that every caller 
will use one of several terms to identify his or her problem (“overdraft”, “charges”, 
“mortgage”, etc) but needs to be robust enough to predict how an arbitrary user the 
system has never encountered before will pronounce these words. Whenever the 
vocabulary can be kept small, e.g. in telephone inquiries, successful systems have 
been developed. Even specialist and technical vocabulary can be identified, but even 
the best systems currently available can only identify several thousand words.  
By contrast, speaker dependent voice recognition software is “tailor made” for the 
individual user who can train the system on his personal particularities in 
pronunciation or dialect prior to use.11 Typically, he will be given test sentences to 
train the system with, repeating them often enough until the computer recognises the 
sentence. On the down side, this means that the system will only work properly with 
one specific user. On the positive side, these systems have a much larger vocabulary 
and higher degrees of accuracy and reliability than speaker-independent systems.12 
The traditional approach to legal expert system design was similar to speaker 
independent voice recognition. It does not matter who the user is, or who the judges 
will be who are going to evaluate and interpret a norm, the system will correctly 
predict their decision. As with voice independent speaker recognition, this is only 
feasible if from the beginning, the number of possible answers is highly restricted and 
a very small vocabulary suffices. Are there now applications conceivable that are 
more similar to speaker dependent voice recognition?  
For these, the user himself would have to be at the same time norm giver and 
interpreter of his own laws. The first condition is easy to fulfill if we remember that 
the main purpose of private law is to enable citizens to establish their own rules 
between themselves. The contracts that we make with each other, the wills and 
testaments that we write, the property dispositions that we undertake all create legal 
norms which bind on the one hand ourselves, but also in an indirect way the judges 
who might have to adjudicate if a party fulfilled their contractual obligations.  
As with parliament, private parties need to formulate the rules they agree to abide by 
in sufficiently general and vague terms to allow for possibly changing circumstances. 
This of course leads to familiar problems in the interpretation of contracts. Normally 
of course, in case of conflict the parties can communicate their respective 
understandings to each other, or an adjudicator if necessary. Implementing this 
process on a computer seems to offer little additional value. Are there however 
conceivable situations where the parties cannot themselves contribute to the 
interpretation of the terms of contract and cannot inform the decision maker how they 
intended the terms to be understood, their wishes, preferences and values that 
informed the norms and can disambiguate any problematic clause? In such a situation, 
                                                 
10
 XD Huang and KF Lee, “On Speaker-Independent, Speaker-Dependent, and Speaker-Adaptive  
Speech Recognition" Proceedings of the International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and  
Signal Processing, ICASSP-91 1991, available at 
http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/ICASSP.1991.150478 (accessed 28 Jul 2010). 
11
 H Beigi, Fundamentals of Speaker Recognition (Springer: New York, 2010). 
12
 J-C Junqua and J Haton, Robustness in Automatic Speech Recognition: Fundamentals and 
Applications (Berlin: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). 
(2010) 7:2 SCRIPTed 
 
391
an expert system that is sufficiently trained on the preferences of the user could assist 
in disambiguating the term in question.  
In medical, inheritance and trust law, we find just this kind of situation. A living will 
establishes for instance general rules about how I want to be treated in case an 
accident or illness permanently deprives me of my ability to communicate or make 
decisions for myself. In inheritance and trust law, I can create rules regarding who 
should benefit from my property after my death by leaving it for instance to trustees 
to act on my behalf and to interpret the rules I laid down. In both cases, I postulate 
rules that I hope are clear and are able to deal with all possible eventualities. Yet we 
know of course that this is not always possible. To take one example, I might decree 
that my property should go after my death to “my grandchildren”. After my demise, it 
transpires that my son had an illegitimate child which he kept hidden from the family 
that I was unaware of.  
A typical question in inheritance law in this case is the meaning of “my 
grandchildren”. Was the illegitimate but biological grandchild covered when I wrote 
“my grandchildren”?  
For obvious reasons, asking me will not be possible.13 Hence, it will be necessary to 
interpret my rules, in the same way in which a judge would interpret an Act of 
Parliament.  
Of course, evidence about my value system, convictions or religious and ethical 
beliefs are relevant pointers for that process, but inevitably a degree of speculation 
would be necessary. But what if I had trained a computer system to learn about my 
personal values in the same way in which I can train a computer to understand my 
voice? Such a system could then be interrogated in my stead, to hear an authentic 
account of “my” opinion on that matter. The neural network at the heart of the system 
would have been trained by asking me standardised questions (Do you think nature is 
more important than nurture – yes or no?) or generating typical ethical problems 
(Would I save someone who is related to me or someone who is my personal friend, 
from a burning building?) and asking for my opinion. Current research in 
“experimental philosophy”, with its emphasis on large datasets of answers from large 
numbers of people across cultures, plays an important role in developing the 
necessary methodology.14 The questions can become increasingly subtle and detailed 
and the user can spend as much time on training the software as he or she wishes.  
In the next step, the system can be validated by the user, developing its own solutions 
that try to mimic the learned behaviour and attitudes, with user feedback for correct 
and incorrect answers. Based on this feedback the system can then model more and 
more accurately my convictions and the ethical rules that govern my behaviour. It is 
my decision when I consider the answers of the system “good enough” to entrust it 
with acting as my legal representative. Here we can see two important differences 
                                                 
13
 In Ryūnosuke Akutagawa’s Rashomon, the ghost of the victim is allowed to give evidence in the trial 
against his murderer. Jacques Orneuve is a famous, real life (?) example of a zombie asking to be 
permitted to give evidence in court (see http://thefullzombie.com/topics/us_law_and_haitian_zombie 
(accessed 2 Jul 2010). However, cross examining the undead is generally frowned upon by modern 
legal systems.. 
14 See e.g. J Knobe and S Nichols (eds), Experimental Philosophy (Oxford: OUP 2008); KA Appiah, 
Experiments in Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); B Musschenga “Was ist 
empirische Ethik?” (2009) 21 Ethik in der Medizin 187-199. 
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from traditional legal AI: My decision is the only relevant benchmark for judging the 
correctness of the answer and I can generate as large a number of training examples as 
I wish – just like voice recognition software that never stops learning. Insights into the 
logical aspects of norm interpretation that have been developed in legal AI would still 
build the formal basis of such a system, revitalising and reusing older AI and law 
research. The knowledge base, on the other hand, is provided by the user. Taken 
together they should be capable of interpreting norms in the light of new situations 
based on the values and preferences of the user, and it would be trivially possible to 
quantify the accuracy that the system has acquired in its predictive power. 
Theoretically, the system would already be a success if it predicted how its owner 
would reinterpret his or her norms in the light of new circumstances better than a third 
party, like a judge, who had no personal knowledge of the deceased and had to base 
its decision exclusively on the textual basis of the will and testament. However, for 
legal and evidentiary reasons, one might require that the system is better than chance 
in its results, meeting the “preponderance of evidence” standard. Whether the system 
has the necessary level of proficiency can of course be documented easily as part of 
the learning process by simply keeping count of the ratio between wrong and right 
answers that the system gives.  
5. Legal and Ethical Implications 
The article has so far described in broad outlines the business model and basic formal 
features for an expert legal system that is capable of assisting a judge in interpreting 
norms created by a private party that has since died or is otherwise incapable of 
disambiguating the rules and norm it created. It uses methods that were first proposed 
for developing a universal legal reasoner or norm interpreter while avoiding most of 
the methodological and practical pitfalls that prevented such a system from becoming 
robust and reliable enough to be of practical use in the past.  
The result would be a system that, like the zombies of lore, falls well short of the full 
intelligence of the person whose behaviour it models. But it would preserve 
nonetheless task specific knowledge that would make it a capable representative.  
The proposal raises some interesting technical, ethical and legal questions. We 
anticipate that the greatest technical problem will be in formulating suitable training 
questions and examples. These need to be capable of generating the right general rules 
to model the value system of the person who trains it correctly. Also of crucial 
importance is ensuring that the system is secure and cannot be hacked into or 
otherwise taken over by a third party. If such a security breach were possible, and if 
we would really permit computers to act as legal representatives of their (deceased) 
owners, such a compromised system would indeed be a zombie, or rather “ZombAI” 
– acting as if it is the voice of its owner, while in reality being under control of a 
malicious agency.  
From a legal perspective, we would need to address if a computer should be permitted 
to act as a representative – or indeed if conceptualising the computer as a 
representative is the most appropriate way to think about such an application. 
Discussions on autonomous agents and the law have recently debated similar issues in 
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some depth,15 with some writers arguing that, in order to form a legally valid offer, an 
autonomous agent software programme would need recognition as legal person.16 
Others have maintained that it is much more appropriate to think of them just as a new 
delivery method for the will of its owner.17 While our system would be semi-
autonomous, and capable of dealing with situations that were not foreseen by (and 
hence not covered by the intent of) its owner, it seems more appropriate, if less 
spectacular, to think of them not so much as the disembodied mind of the person who 
trained it, but simply as a new way to record ones wishes and intentions.  
Furthermore, it is assumed throughout this paper that establishing the “true” intent of 
the testator is a desirable outcome under all circumstances. German law at least seems 
to indicate that this is the case.18 But as a society, we might actually not want to give 
the dead too much control over the present and restrict our ability to act as we see fit. 
After all, the dead outnumber the living by some margin.  
The role of the interpreter in this case would be not just to establish the true intent of 
the deceased but also to find a sustainable compromise between the needs of the 
present and respect for the past. The more time moves on, the greater that conflict can 
potentially become. Our proposed system is based on the assumption that a person’s 
ethical and moral preferences remain stable and that only the set of circumstances to 
which it is applied changes. This is of course highly unrealistic, as anyone who briefly 
reflects on the ideals of his or her youth will realise. Also in this respect, our system is 
eerily reminiscent of the zombies from literature: only living things can learn and 
change, the undead by contrast are doomed to remain unchanging, incapable of 
learning and static. Despite these concerns, as a first step to find practical applications 
for the sophisticated methods and models developed in AI and law research, 
developing systems to assist in interpreting a person’s will when they are no longer 
able to speak for themselves is a promising reorientation for research. 
                                                 
15
 IR Kerr, “The Legality of Software-Mediated Transactions” in Proceedings of IASTED  
International Conference: Law and Technology (Calgary: ACTA Press, 2000) 87-96; J Shaheed and J 
Cunningham, “Agents making moral decisions” presented at the ECAI2008 Workshop on Artificial 
Intelligence in Games (AIG'08), Patras, 2008, available at 
http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/jss00_ecai08.pdf (accessed 8 Jul 10). 
16
 S Wettig, E Zehender, “A Legal Analysis of Human and Electronic Agents” (2004) 12 Artificial 
Intelligence and Law 111- 135. 
17
 G Sartor, “Cognitive Automata and the Law: Electronic Contracting and the Intentionality of 
Software Agents” (2009) 17 Artificial Intelligence and Law 253-290. 
18
 R Foer, Die Regel “Falsa demonstratio non nocet” unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Testamentsauslegung (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1987). 
